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Organized Arson as a Political Crime.
The Construction of a «Terrorist»
Menace in the Early Modern Period1
Johannes Dillinger
1 Organized arson was regarded as the most dangerous political crime of the early modern
period. There is an abundance of records concerning organisations of incendiarists from
French,  English  or  German speaking Europe.  The  activities  of  these  organizations of
arsonists were not designed to do harm to individuals. Arsonists’ gangs were allegedly
responsible for the conflagration of whole towns. They were even supposed to plan the
destruction of entire territorial states e.g. the Southwest German duchy of Württemberg2.
The incendiarist gangs allegedly worked for foreign powers, for the political and / or
denominational adversaries of their respective victims. The arsonists were supposed to be
vagrants,  most of them street beggars.  In German, organized itinerant arsonists were
called ‘Mordbrenner’  which originally meant ‘clandestine arsonists’  but became to be
understood as ‘murder arsonists’.
2 The  following  text  focuses  first  on  the  various  ways  in  which  arsonist  groups  were
imagined. Special attention will be paid to the circumstances under which such images
were created. The fight against alleged arsonist conspiracies in criminal law and police
practice and its  interrelation with state building processes  will  be discussed.  Finally,
suggestions concerning new avenues of historical research will be made. The focus of the
whole article will be on materials from the German Southwest, especially sources relating
to a supposed series of arsonist attacks connected with a peasant insurrection in 1517.
 
Covert Warfare?
3 The list of those who allegedly engaged in secret warfare against their enemies by hiring
vagabonds as arsonists is long and impressive. A few examples shall suffice. One of the
earliest cases of politically motivated organized arson is the Bundschuh of 1517. Prior to
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the Great Peasants’  War (1524-1526) the German Southwest experienced a number of
peasant  rebellions,  the  so-called  Bundschuh  upheavals3.  The term  Bundschuh was
originally used for cheap footwear worn by peasants. As rebellious peasants chose the
Bundschuh as their symbol the word ‘Bundschuh’ took the meaning of ‘organized peasant
upheaval’.  There  were  Bundschuh activities  in  1493  in  Schlettstadt  (Alsace),  1502  in
Untergrombach (Baden), 1513 in Lehen near Freiburg im Breisgau and supposedly in 1517
in the entire upper Rhine region on both sides of the river.  None of these rebellions
succeeded.  The sixteenth century Bundschuh risings were all  supposed to have been
initiated and organized by the same man: Joss Fritz, a peasant and surveyor of the fences
from the village of Untergrombach. After the failure of his two earlier insurgencies Fritz
supposedly  chose  a  new  tactic  in  1517.  He  allegedly  recruited  a  large  number  of
vagabonds. In turn, these vagabonds were to recruit new adherents to the Bundschuh
among the rural population. In addition to that, the vagarants were paid to raise fires at
the beginning and throughout the uprising. One of these vagabonds was arrested and
betrayed all the plans of Fritz. Thus, the 1517 Bundschuh revolt was over before it even
started. In 1524 three hundred houses burned down in Troyes4. The damage was blamed
on vagabonds who were said to work for the Habsburgs. These arsonists were allegedly
about to target other towns in France. At the imperial diet at Regensburg in 1540, the
Protestant  estates  demanded  that  emperor  Charles  V  should  take  action  against  a
Catholic conspiracy. This conspiracy supposedly planned to eradicate the new creed by
destroying whole regions: a series of arsonist attacks by vagrant beggars were to raze
Protestant  towns  and  villages  to  the  ground.  As  one  might  expect,  Heinrich  von
Braunschweig was supposed to pull the strings of this conspiracy in the Reich while the
pope himself financed this gigantic autodafé5. In German Habsburg countries there were
rumours about arsonist attacks organized by the Hussites in the 1420s, by the Venetians
in early sixteenth century and finally by the Turks from the sixteenth to the eighteenth
centuries6. In the sixteenth century, princes who had been forced out of their territories
were  suspected  to  have  made  pacts  with  itinerant  arsonists  to  prepare  the  military
retaking of their respective lands. Duke Ulrich of Württemberg and Albrecht Alcibiades
von Brandenburg-Kulmbach are well-known examples7. On a smaller scale, members of
Southwestern  Germany’s  lower  nobility  were  accused  of  having  enlisted  the  help  of
Mordbrenner against the domineering power of the dukes of Württemberg8.  After the
devastating fire of London, British cities took measures against vagrants who were said to
be the henchmen of the Quakers, or of the Catholics. These religious minorities were
supposed to be eager to spread terror and insecurity in the Anglican kingdom9. There
were rumours about organized crime in Poland in the seventeenth century10.  A Polish
secret organization was said to offer the ‘services’ of tramps as arsonists. Probably the
best-know example of politically motivated organized arson is that of the arsonist scare
in revolutionary France. During the Grande Peur especially the rural population feared a
pact between the aristocracy and the itinerant poor11. The vagrants were to raise fires to
destroy the crops  and to  spread fear  and tumult  in  order  to  stop the revolutionary
movement. During the English ‘Captain Swing’ protests of the 1830s it was rumoured that
Irish itinerant working men were paid by wealthy Jews to commit arson. The adherents of
‘Captain  Swing’  were  at  pains  to  emphasize  that  they  did  not  cooperate  with  the
fireraisers12.
4 The conspiracy theories concerning the Great Fire of London were finally rejected in the
early nineteenth century. Lefebvre proved that the Grande Peur was based on nothing but
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rumours: the most unlikely pact between vagabonds and aristocrats had indeed never
existed13. However, historians have seriously discussed the other cases of organized arson
as  specific  forms  of  early  modern  crime  or  covert  warfare.  Concerning  the  German
Mordbrenner  historiography  pointed  to  inconsistencies  in  individual  trial  records.
Spicker-Beck admitted that the confessions of some Mordbrenner seem hard to believe
and conceded that the use of torture makes it extremely difficult to decide which parts of
the confessions of supposed arsonists were based on their actual behaviour. However, she
accepted the Mordbrenner files as «a representation of a kind of crime typical for that
time  [the  sixteenth  century]  (das  Abbild  einer  typischen  Erscheingungsform  der
Kriminalität dieser Zeit).  Finally,  Spicker-Beck concluded that because of the criminal
gangs of vagabonds she personally would not have liked to travel one of the dangerous
country roads of sixteenth century Germany («Ich hätte nicht unterwegs sein wollen…»)14
. Scribner suggested that the Mordbrenner fear might have been crossly exaggerated. He
stated  that  there  were  probably  serious  misconceptions  concerning  the  scope  of
organized arson. He spoke about a «paranoia» of early modern governments which were
quick  to  suspect  and  to  punish  people  for  organized  political  crime  without  any
conclusive evidence. Nevertheless, he considered the existence of bands of fireraisers as
too «well-attested» to be dismissed as a delusion. Scribner admitted that tramps were
victims of a scapegoating process initiated by state authorities. However, he assumed that
they fought back and resorted to extremely violent crime including organized arson15.
5 The very fact  that  organized arson was  supposed to  have been used in a  variety  of
religious and political conflicts throughout the early modern period is apt to raise doubts
concerning the reality of arsonist conspiracies. Fires that damaged or destroyed towns
might be explained as simple accidents. As they were largely built from timber and straw
early modern settlements were indeed extremely vulnerable to conflagration. It did not
take carefully  planned arsonist  attacks to burn whole towns to the ground.  In 1540,
Germany witnessed numerous fires most of which were blamed on arsonist vagabonds.
1540, however, was an extremely hot and dry year16. The simple evidence of a fire or a
number of fires is not sufficient to substantiate the assumption that there was organized
arson.
6 As the vagabond fireraisers were supposed to work for princes we might expect some
kind of documentation about their recruitment in the records of state agencies. To my
knowledge,  until  now  no  government  records  whatsoever  about  this  kind  of  covert
warfare have been unearthed.  The arsonists  claimed to have been paid by agents  of
various lords but there is no evidence for these financial transactions. This lack of source
materials could be explained by the secrecy of the arsonist organization. Officeholders or
aristocrats who paid arsonists would of course try to obscure their connection to them.
Thus, it is certainly possible that no records were kept or that all the records were quickly
destroyed in order to make it impossible to trace arsonist attacks back to those high
ranking persons who initiated and financed them.
7 To find out if  there really was politically motivated organized incendiarism the trial
records themselves have to be analysed. There are virtually no statements of the suspects
that  were  not  made  under  torture  or  the  threat  of  torture.  There  are  few  witness
accounts and hardly any witnesses who spoke in favour of the defendants. Arson was
supposed to be organized crime: Anybody in close contact with the suspects could be
regarded as an accomplice. As most of the suspects were itinerants few people of any
standing in the respective community would claim to know them let alone would be
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willing  to  defend  them.  The  records  of  many  trials  consist  of  little  more  than  a
confession. An analysis of these confessions is considerably facilitated by the fact that
they  usually  describe  a  largely  unchanging  set  of  actions.  There  was  a  pattern  of
Mordbrenner confessions. If the structural elements this pattern consists of interrelate
which each other consistently and if they are plausible in their respective contexts, then
we must consider the confessions themselves credible.
8 First of all, it is supremely important to note that all the persons engaged in arsonist plots
were supposed to be male. Of course, there were female arsonists. But they were blamed
exclusively for arson as an individual  act  of  revenge against  certain persons.  Female
arsonists  were never  said to  ‘work’  in  gangs17.  Organized arson was regarded as  the
exclusive  domain  of  vagrant  men.  Even  if  vagrant  women  were  arrested  during
investigations  against  vagabond fireraisers  no further  legal  action was  taken against
them for arson. Female itinerants were only considered guilty when additional charges of
murder or theft were brought18.
9 All arsonists were allegedly recruited in roughly the same way19. A vagrant accidentally
met a person who presented himself as the agent of some foreign potentate. As a rule this
person was a total stranger or even a foreigner the tramp had never met before. In other
instances it was a person he knew superficially, sometimes another vagrant. In the latter
case, this vagrant had been hired earlier by foreigners with the expressed purpose to
form a gang of arsonists. The agent offered the vagabond a certain sum of money for
raising  fire  in  a  certain  region.  The would-be  arsonist  was  paid  immediately  by  the
stranger. Sometimes it was said that the recruiting person even provided the vagabond
with slow-matches or gunpowder.
10 After that the arsonist was basically left to his own devices. The confessions turned into a
cumulative enumeration of various acts of arson with little structure. Very like the first
contact between the fireraiser and his ‘principal’ all following meetings, if they took place
at  all,  did  so  purely  by chance.  Mostly,  such additional  meetings  did not  take place
because of organizational difficulties. In many cases, they had not even been planned. The
‘principal’ told the arsonist almost nothing about actual tactics. Nothing was said about
the concrete time or place of the arsonist attack. Mordbrenner claimed to have been paid
for  raising  fires  somewhere  in  Württemberg  or  even somewhere  in  the  Reich.  They
seemed to be equally happy to attack a village or a town, a monastery, a manor, a cottage
or  a  barn.  This  striking  vagueness  could  mean  that  the  arsonists’  gangs  employed
‘terrorist’  tactics: It is characteristic of terrorism that the immediate target often has
hardly any connection to the strategic aim of the attack. The victim of the aggressive act
and  the  adversary  it  is  meant  to  be  directed  against  are  not  identical.  Spreading
insecurity and chaos is at least as important as causing material damage. The strategic
objectives  of  the  respective  ‘principals’  remained  as  a  rule  shadowy.  The  arsonist’s
‘employer’ did hardly give any particulars concerning the political aims of the crimes. In
a rare exception,  in 1538 the South German petty aristocrat  Gangolf  von Geroldseck
allegedly  delivered  a  short  hate  speech  in  front  of  a  somewhat  perplexed  arsonist:
Geroldseck explained that his family had been wronged by the dukes of Württemberg and
cheated out of the possession of the town of Sulz. Therefore, he wanted Sulz burned to
the ground20.
11 It is difficult to picture any organizational patterns of the arsonists’ groups. Some of the
source  materials  mention ‘officers’  of  the  incendiarists.  However,  the  questions  who
invested these officers with what powers remain open. What the source materials do
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reveal is an amazing flexibility of the arsonists’ gangs. Groups formed and dispersed again
at will. There were no fixed meeting places. If there were plans to reunite a scattered
team of arsonists these plans usually failed. If Mordbrenner belonged to a greater group
in the pay of the same ‘employer’ they were said to use secret signs to recognize each
other. There was allegedly a variety of such signs, e.g. girdles made from straw or white
staffs21.  These  signs  were  mentioned  in  confessions  and  warrants  of  apprehension.
However, they do not seem ever to have helped to catch a fireraiser. The same holds true
for Mordbrenner marks22. Vagrant arsonists were said to use marks as a kind of signature.
Historiography attributed a list of such marks to the arsonists who were said to work for
the Bundschuh of 1517 (figure 1)23.  However, these marks are in all likelihood several
years  younger24.  The  marks  themselves  are  rather  complicated.  It  seems  highly
questionable  whether  incendiarists  ever  really  used  them  as  a  means  to  identify
themselves.
12 This  nearly complete lack of  organizational  structures in the incendiary conspiracies
strongly  suggests  that  arsonists’  confessions had  no  basis  in  reality  outside  of  the
courtroom. It is implausible that the respective ‘principals’ – many of them influential
lords with considerable means – should have been unable or even unwilling to create an
organizational apparatus to control their vagrant henchmen. The suggestion that foreign
powers paid vagabonds in advance for dangerous and criminal acts without any effective
means of control appears to be highly questionable. It is even more implausible that the
vagabonds  after  receiving  their  payment  really  committed  arson  just  to  fulfil  their
respective contracts. They had nothing to gain anymore from doing so but risked being
caught and punished. Even if their ‘employer’ had promised additional payments after
they had committed the crime the extraordinarily weak structure of the conspiracy made
it unlikely that they would meet their ‘principal’ again to collect their money.
 
Figure 1: Mordbrenner marks. Southwestern Germany, about 153025
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13 Some historians emphasized the fact  that  the vagrant  population consisted partly  of
mercenaries  looking  for  a  new employer26.  Therefore,  they  considered  the  arsonists’
confessions credible: The incendiary conspiracy was supposed to have been a parallel to
the  mercenary  system,  as  it  were  a  secret  army  for  covert  warfare.  However,  the
mercenary system of early modern armies was absolutely different from the arsonist
system as it appears in the court records. First of all, mercenaries as a rule knew the
recruitment officer who contacted them or at least the military leader they agreed to
work for. Before they joined the ranks of the respective army they did not receive any
pay at all aside from a small sum that enabled them to come to the mustering place.
Anybody who received regular pay was subject to military discipline and forbidden to
leave  the  troop.  Of  course,  there  were  irregular  re-groupings  of  military  units  and
numerous desertions that made mercenary armies at times resemble the ‘anti-system’ of
the arsonists’ gangs. However, if military discipline broke down this was due to the lack
of regular pay27.  In contrast to that, the arsonists’  groups were disorganized to begin
with. We have to return to the question: Are we to suppose that princes spend money on
people they could not control? Or that these princes did not even try to exercise control
over them? When compared to the mercenary system, the arsonist conspiracy makes
even less sense.
14 Did the vagrant population itself have an organizational structure that was capable of
making up for the disorganization of  the arsonist  conspiracies? The idea of  vagrants
belonging to arsonist organizations was supported by another popular imagination of
vagrancy:  Beggars  and  vagabonds  were  supposed  to  form secret  societies.  Since  the
Middle Ages, the source materials allude to organizations of itinerants and beggars with
their own structure of offices. There were allegedly fraternities of vagabonds, societies of
beggars and even kingdoms of vagrants with estates and diets of their own28. The best-
known element of this counter-state of itinerants is probably the tramps’ court on the
Kohlenberg near Basel. The ‘brigand’ (or ‘rogue’) literature helped to spread the idea of a
secret ‘monarchie d’argot’.  Some of these supposed beggar organizations were indeed
mere  fictions,  literary  fantasies  that  mingled  with  sensational  reports  of  the  early
modern news sheet ‘press’. Others were real enough. On closer inspection however, the
fraternities of beggars and the vagabond officials turn out to have been institutions or
officeholders of state or church that were designed to control the homeless poor. The so-
called beggar kings were officials who policed vagrants. Even the court on the Kohlenberg
was by no means autonomous but under the close supervision of the Basel magistrate29.
The  fact  that  these  policing  agencies  were  reinterpreted  as  autonomous,  potentially
dangerous  organizations  of  the  itinerants  themselves  eloquently  demonstrates  that
peasants  and  townspeople  considered  the  homeless  dangerous  without  knowing  too
much about them30.
15 It  seems safe to assume that the fear of  politically motivated organized arson was a
delusion.  Of  course,  there  were  individual  tramps  who  burned  down  the  houses  of
peasants who had treated them badly. To be sure, there were unemployed mercenaries
who used fire to punish persons they considered their adversaries. Threats of arson were
evidently used for blackmail31.  There might even have been individual criminals who
accepted payment for setting fire to the house of some specific person. Nevertheless, it is
highly implausible that there were arsonists’  conspiracies,  politically motivated arson
perpetrated by vagrants in the pay of princes. The Mordbrenner were an imaginary, not a
real menace. In this respect they may well be compared to the witches or to the Jewish
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conspirators who allegedly plotted ritual murder and mass poisonings32. In contrast to
Jews and witches the vagabond arsonists seemed to have no single purpose. They were
said  to  work  for  a  number  of  different  ‘principals’.  Thus,  they  served  a  number  of
different ends. There were even rumours about competing gangs of arsonists. The dukes
of Württemberg as well as their political opponents were suspected to pay for arsonist
attacks on each other. This apparent variety of the arsonists’ purposes made it difficult to
realize that the whole organizational concept of secret societies of itinerant fireraisers
was  implausible.  In  this  respect  the  arsonist  vagabonds  resembled  other  supposedly
criminal organizations of itinerants more closely: The poisoners. In fourteenth century
France there were numerous rumours about vagrants who used poison to spread leprosy
or the plague. Supposedly, the Jews or the Muslims paid for these ‘bioterrorist’ attacks
because they hoped that they could destroy Christianity that way. Even though the trials
against  mass  poisoners  and  plaguespreaders  seem  to  have  been  considerably  less
numerous  than those  against  arsonists  they continued throughout  the  early  modern
period. Alleged Plaguespreaders were persecuted in Geneva in the 1530s and 1540s. The
outbreaks of the plague in Lyon in the 1560s were blamed on the Hugenots, the London
plague of 1665-1666 on foreigners from France. In the seventeenth century in Southern
Germany,  there  were  rumours  about  itinerant  fruit  vendors  from  Italy. They  were
supposed to smear venom on church doors or door handles and thus poison numerous
people33.
 
The Construction of the Arsonist Scare: History and
Historiography
16 The  results  of  this  study  so  far  beg  the  question  how  the  Mordbrenner  delusion
originated. Why were arsonist conspiracies considered real? To answer this question, I
suggest a distinction between two contexts. The first one is the concrete regional or local
context at any given time. Within this context it has to be discussed why at least the
respective authorities assumed that there was a direct threat of organized arson. Second,
there  is  a  wider  cultural  context.  Within  this  context  it  has  to  be  asked  why  the
imagination of organized arson by the homeless poor as such was basically considered
credible.
17 I  will  discuss the first  context  using an early example of  the Mordbrenner fear that
attracted considerable attention:  The Bundschuh peasant rising of  151734.  The source
materials about the Bundschuh revolt of 1517 are in many ways typical for sources about
organized arson: There are no statements whatsoever by the alleged arsonists that were
not elicited by torture or under the threat of torture. There are no witness accounts.
There are, however, numerous statements by alarmed office holders who warn each other
against a peasant upheaval. The council of the Habsburg city of Freiburg and the Vogt
(bailiff) of the Baden district of Rötteln took the lead in the investigations against the
peasant rebels and their arsonist accomplices. Even questionable rumours about a new
Bundschuh were sufficient to alert the Freiburg authorities. From May 1517 onwards,
they spread warnings about an impending revolt without having any tangible evidence.
Early in September 1517 the Vogt of Rötteln arrested one Michel of Dinkelsbühl, a vagrant
juggler. Michel confessed that he belonged to a huge Bundschuh conspiracy that involved
more than 2000 people living on both sides of the Rhine, 300 of which he claimed to know
by name. This gigantic new Bundschuh allegedly consisted of peasants and townspeople
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who had hired arsonist vagabonds as their Fifth Column. Michael said hardly anything
about the concrete tactics and the aims of the Bundschuh. However, his denunciations
were enough to galvanize Rötteln and Freiburg into action. All investigations against the
1517 Bundschuh were founded on Michael’s evidence alone. The Vogt informed numerous
Southwest German principalities about Michel’s confession with amazing speed. Within
days,  he  and Freiburg  established a  communication network  with  themselves  at  the
centre. Even though investigations carried out by the authorities of several territories did
not have any positive results, Freiburg urged other principalities to keep searching for
suspects. The people Michel had named as his accomplices could not be found. During a
second interrogation by an emissary of the sceptical town council of Strasbourg Michel
began to contradict himself and de facto retracted his denunciations. Freiburg ignored
this new evidence. The town council even took the trouble to emphasize openly that it
continued to belief in the Bundschuh menace and demanded further investigations by the
neighbouring  authorities.  However,  the  man-hunt  against  members  of  the  alleged
Bundschuh conspiracy petered out by the middle of October 1517. One Klaus Fleckenstein
was arrested and confessed under torture to be a member of the Bundschuh. There was
no  correspondence  whatsoever  between  Fleckenstein’s  statement  and  Micheal’s
confession. Needless to say, both supposed insurrectionists did not know each other35.
Freiburg never admitted that the investigations against the Bundschuh had been a failure
and that the evidence strongly suggested that there was no new Bundschuh i.e.  that
Michel’s confession had been false. As late as December 1518, the Freiburg town council
advocated the arrest  and torture  of  persons  who according to  other  authorities  had
already proven their innocence.
18 The fear of a peasant uprising and arson in Freiburg and in Rötteln was undoubtedly real.
Both territories had been immediately threatened by a Bundschuh only four years ago. In
Freiburg, there had been a fire in 1513 that was quickly blamed on the rebels. As Freiburg
and Rötteln had taken the lead in the fight against this earlier revolt  too,  they now
expected  the  revenge  of  Joss  Fritz’  followers.  However,  they  were  both  so  keen  to
demonstrate  the alertness  and strength of  their  policing agencies  in 1517 that  mere
caution or nervousness on their part is no sufficient explanation for their behaviour. The
authorities of both territories faced acute political problems. Rötteln was situated at the
periphery of the Margraviate of Baden near the Swiss border. Since the fifteenth century
a so-called Landschaft existed in Rötteln i.e. a self-governing organization of the peasant
communities.  The  Vogt  of  Rötteln  was  constantly  confronted  with  this  largely
autonomous  representation  of  the  ‘subjects’.  In  1517  the  situation  of  the  Vogt  was
especially vulnerable as the margrave had ordered him to negotiate a new code of law
with the Landschaft. Freiburg faced similar difficulties. The town council was working on
a new town law that was to be submitted to the Habsburg lordship in December 1517. The
council expected long and difficult negotiations about questions of communal autonomy.
It would in fact take three more years till Freiburg’s new town law was finally enacted.
The Freiburg town council  as well  as Rötteln’s Vogt probably hoped that they would
strengthen their respective positions if they demonstrated that they were able to take
action against rebels and criminals quickly and decisively. Subsequently, neither of them
could possibly admit that they had not been sceptical enough concerning Michel’s story
about a huge arsonist Bundschuh rising. This would have invited severe criticism or even
ridicule.  Additionally,  the Vogt of Rötteln was obviously very interested in attracting
attention to  his  personal  abilities.  He  ignored his  direct  superior  and contacted  the
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margrave  immediately.  He  even  went  to  see  the  lords  of  neighbouring  territories
personally to bring them the news about the conspiracy he had supposedly uncovered36.
19 The fear of a new Bundschuh rising in 1517 was not completely unfounded. Southwestern
Germany experienced a severe economical crisis between 1515 and 1518. Freiburg faced
starvation and an epidemic. The town council asked the monasteries to hold masses and
processions to ward off further misery. In addition to that, Freiburg’s relation to its rural
hinterland  was  exceedingly  problematic.  The  stagnating  town  faced  economic
competition from prospering villages, while at the same time the Freiburg council tried to
tighten  its  political  control  over  the  neighbouring  hamlets  and  small  towns37.  The
peasants of the Black Forest region were indeed restless and hostile to the authorities of
the Habsburg city and the aristocratic states. Only eight years later the region became
one of the centres of the Great Peasants’ War.
20 At least three factors contributed to the genesis of the Bundschuh anxiety in 1517. A first
look  at  several  other  cases  of  arsonist  fear  in  France  and  Germany  documented  by
Bechstein, Helleiner, Delumeau, Scribner, Roberts, Lefebvre, and Ramsay suggests that
these three factors might indeed constitute the basic conditions for the emergence of an
acute fear of organized arson. A short outline of these factors might be useful as a point of
reference for further research.
21 First, there had to be a working infrastructure of communication within the given region
and  at  least  one  government  that  was  able  to  use  this  infrastructure  to  direct  the
attention of its neighbours to the supposed arsonist plot. In 1517, Rötteln and Freiburg, at
least for a few weeks, had been able to dominate the discussion about the Bundschuh
menace38.
22 Second, there had to be a political and / or economical crisis that appeared to threaten
this government. This crisis might have resulted from structural problems within the
government organization itself. It might also have appeared to threaten one part of the
respective political apparatus more than other parts. In our example, the Vogt of Rötteln
had more to lose (and more to gain) in the fight against the supposed conspiracy than his
immediate superior or the margrave himself39.
23 Third, there had to be a real if diffuse or latent threat by a hostile force. In the Bundschuh
example, the peasantry of the region was indeed hostile to the authorities40.
24 Combinations of all three factors often occurred. That is the reason why after big fires the
authorities  of  a  variety  of  political  systems  did  not  hesitate  to  investigate  against
organized arson throughout the early modern period.
25 The question about the second context is still unanswered. Why was the imagination of
organized arson by vagrants considered credible at all? Vagrants, very like Jews, Muslims,
Indians and the imaginary group of the witches belonged to the archetypical ‘evil people’
of the early modern period41. As they lived outside of parish structures of authority and
were therefore not subject to the cura animarum and the church discipline they were
usually excluded from the sacraments42.  Since the fourteenth century there had been
rumours about criminal conspiracies of poor itinerant people43.  The homeless did not
belong to any estate.  Their marginalization seemed to give them a reason to avenge
themselves upon society. This very marginalization of the itinerants made it difficult to
control them, indeed to know anything specific about them. When the liber vagatorum
that  denounced all  vagrant  beggars  as  frauds  was  first  published  in  1510  is  was  an
immediate success44. As has been mentioned above, the homeless poor were supposed to
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have their own shadowy secret organizations. Thus, in the public imagination vagrants
formed a criminal counter-society that was hidden from the state authorities as well as
from the everyday society of townspeople and peasants. They did not belong to any estate
but they were still  supposed to be organized. This quality together with their alleged
viciousness made it plausible to suspect them as the perpetrators of organized arson.
26 Gender  stereotypes  played  an  important  role  in  the  construction  of  the  arsonist
conspiracies. Even though there were of course itinerants of both sexes, the members of
the imaginary arsonist gangs were all supposed to be male. Criminal violence was indeed
largely a male domain and it might therefore have been easy to imagine arsonists as male.
However,  this explanation is insufficient.  Rather,  a competing imagination of gender-
specific  crime  eliminated  women  from  the  alleged  arsonists’  conspiracy.  There  was
already a powerful alternative image of the evil, mindlessly aggressive woman: that of the
witch. Numerous homeless women fell victim to witch trials. In the context of witch trials
charges of organized arson together with those of magic could be brought against women
45.
27 It has been said above that vagabond arsonists seemed not to have had a common goal
insofar  as  they  were  supposed  to  work  for  different  employers  with  different  aims.
However, all vagrant arsonists were thought to have a common purpose: They caused
destruction for its own sake. The ridiculously small sums of money shadowy agents of
some foreign potentate allegedly offered the vagrants for raising fire did not constitute a
sufficient motive for their crimes. Time and again we find in the sources the conviction
that  itinerant  beggars  were  mindlessly  destructive46.  Tramps  who  were  arrested  as
fireraisers  were even forced to repeat  the condemnation of  vagrants  as  evil  persons
themselves: When the itinerant beggar Hans Spydelin confessed before the criminal court
of Urach in Württemberg in 1526 that he had belonged to a gang of fireraisers he said by
way of explanation: «There is no more accursed and no more evil man or beast than
beggars»  («Es  sy  kain  verfliechtiger  beser  mensch  noch  thier  dann  bettler»)47.  The
indiscriminate and irrational destruction caused by huge fires was thought to be the
expression of the viciousness of vagrants. The vagabonds’ will to destroy was not the
result but the precondition of all the machinations of foreign potentates. Whereas in the
popular  mind  the  external  enemies  that  were  supposed  to  hire  the  tramps  were
interchangeable and never came to the fore, the organization of itinerants was the centre
of attention.
28 Why  did  historians  largely  accept  the  arsonists’  conspiracies  as  facts?  Prior  to  the
anthropological  turn in  historiography and the  quantum leap in  witchcraft  research
connected with it, historians had been too ready to read court records as descriptions of
reality48. In addition to that, the idea of organized arson by vagrants was acceptable to
early  authors  because  they  shared the  prejudice  against  the  homeless.  The  research
literature and editions of source materials published by the criminologist and mystery
author Avé-Lallemant, the theologian Rosenkranz, the historians Franz and Helleiner still
influence the relevant historiography today. Avé-Lallemant considered the description of
an organized and largely secret criminal subculture that included vagrants one of his
great personal achievements49.  Helleiner explicitly stated that tramps,  those «obscure
gangs … of riff-raff (lichtscheue Banden … Lumpengesindels)», were likely to engage in
criminal activities50. Rosenkranz depicted tramps as Mephistophelian geniuses who were
capable of manipulating peasants at will.  He claimed that vagabonds had an inherent
tendency  to  become  criminals51.  Roughly  at  the  same  time  Franz  published  on  the
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Bundschuh and the Great Peasants’ War, he joined the NSDAP and the SS. It comes as no
surprise that he sympathised with the Bundschuh rebels but expressed contempt for
their  vagrant  henchmen52.  Of  course,  Scribner  and  Spicker-Beck  did  not  share  the
prejudice  against  vagabonds.  However,  not  even  they  could  distance  themselves
sufficiently from the earlier authors’ decision to accept the sources concerning organized
arson as at least partly reliable.
 
Organized Arson and the Emerging State
29 It is highly unlikely that organized gangs of itinerants paid by political leaders to commit
arson in order to further political aims ever existed. The Mordbrenner fear was a delusion
comparable to the fear of witches, Jewish conspirators or plaguespreaders. However, the
emerging  states  of  the  early  modern  period  went  to  great  lengths  to  eradicate  the
arsonist conspiracies just as they persecuted witches.
30 An exhaustive study of the legal history of arson in the early modern period would be
well beyond the scope of this text53. A few outlines shall be sufficient. The end of the
Middle Ages witnessed the criminalization of the feud. The aristocracy’s ‘private’ warfare
in which fire had been the weapon of choice was banned and vanished slowly from the
political culture54. At the same time, jurists began to differentiate the individual motives
of arsonists. A common arsonist (incendiarius simplex or temerarius) started a fire to
harm  an  individual  person.  But  there  was  also  the  Mordbrenner,  the  incendiarius
famosus or incendiarius seditiosus, an entirely different type of criminal. A Mordbrenner
aimed at harming the whole community. His victim was not an individual, his victim was
society55. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, juridical authors were less and less
concerned with the circumstances of incendiary acts or with the actual harm caused by
them. From the seventeenth century onwards the will to cause damage for its own sake,
to do harm to the community was the central feature of arson56. Arson had to be punished
most severely because it was a threat to the entire society. From the sixteenth century
onwards it was communis opinio among jurists that secret criminal organizations were
responsible for arsonist crime. The incendiarists were supposed to do the bidding of a
third party. In the eighteenth century, a contract between arsonists and agents of an
enemy  prince  was  considered  an  integral,  indeed  a  ‘normal’  part  of  incendiarism.
Arsonist  crime was  organized  crime.  In  contrast  to  the  incendiarius  simplex  the
Mordbrenner  was  said  to  ‘work’  in  secret  groups.  From the  early  sixteenth  century
onwards, jurists took it for granted that arsonists were organized in itinerant gangs57.
Thus, jurists not only accepted conspiracies of fire raisers as facts. By describing them,
they help to spread the fear of organized arson as a political crime.
31 Between the early sixteenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries, police laws and
mandates  against  incendiarism  declared  time  and  again  that  organized  groups  of
vagrants were responsible for arson (Table 1). The fight against arsonist crime became
part and parcel of the innumerable measures against the itinerant poor. The Poor Law of
Kurtrier claimed that tramps spread poverty as they ruined people by burning down their
houses58. King Ferdinand issued a mandate that ordered authorities to arrest and question
all suspicious vagrants as the country was plagued with arson59. In 1555, a mandate from
Württemberg  stated  that  a  close  watch  had  to  be  held  on  all  vagrants  as  they  had
threatened whole towns with arson time and again60. After a devastating fire, the city of
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Bremen enforced new regulations concerning fire-fighting in 1723. It was part of these
regulations to exclude foreign beggars from the Bremen territory61.
 
Table 1: German Police Mandates Mentioning Organized Arson Committed by Vagrants62
Year Territory Reference 
1520 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 83
1533 Lindau Spicker-Beck, 366
1536 Pfalz-Neuburg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 29
1538 Kleve-Mark Härter/Stolleis, vol. 2.1, 73
1540 Lower Austria Helleiner, 338
1546 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 169
1548 Austria under Enns Helleiner, 337
1551 Lower Austria Helleiner, 338
1555 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 212
1556 Württemberg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 4, 157
1560 Lower Austria Helleiner, 339
1563 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 265
1565 Kurbayern Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 356, 357
1569 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 290
1577 Salzburg Helleiner, 340
1583 Tyrol and Habsburg Vorlande Tiroler Landesarchiv Innsbruck, CD12,fol. 598r
1587 Württemberg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 4, 241
1590 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 429
1594 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 458
1604 Habsburg Lands Helleiner, 343
1616 Habsburg Lands Helleiner, 344
1664 Kurpfalz Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.2, 823
1675 Austria under Enns Helleiner, 345
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1694 Württemberg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 4, 1375
1699 Baden-Durlach Härter/Stolleis, vol. 4, 345
1707 Württemberg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 4, 1622
1723 Brandenburg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 2.1, 1767
1723 Bremen Staatsarchiv Bremen, 2D19f1
1732 Kurköln Härter/Stolleis, vol. 1, 845
1750 Jülich-Berg Härter/Stolleis, vol. 3.1, 1271
32 The search for itinerant arsonists put a severe strain on the abilities of early modern law
enforcement agencies. If an incendiarist was not arrested immediately, the ‘police’ forces
and courts of several jurisdictions had to cooperate to have a chance to catch the vagrant.
During their fight against the alleged Bundschuh in 1517 Freiburg and Rötteln went out of
their way to entice the other principalities of Southwest Germany to cooperate with them
against  the  alleged  rebels  and  their  itinerant  arsonist  henchmen.  In  the  1530s,  the
Württemberg  government  was  eager  to  be  informed  about  arson  committed  in  the
electorate of Trier63. It comes as no surprise that in the late seventeenth century Salzburg
authorities  were  worried  about  news  from  North  Germany  and  Transylvania  about
arsonists  paid  by  the  Turks64.  Arsonists  from Sachsen-Gotha  and Sachsen-Weißenfels
were not only searched for in Hanover they were even supposed to constitute a serious
threat  for  this  principality  in  172565.  Long  lists  of  supposed  accomplices  with  often
detailed  descriptions  of  their  appearance  became a  standard feature  of  the  criminal
records  in  cases  of  arson.  Authorities  sent  these  lists  to  the  courts  of  neighbouring
principalities routinely or on request. As early as 1536 the extraordinarily well-organized
government of Württemberg had lists of supposed Mordbrenner who were searched for
between  Tuttlingen  and  Frankfort,  Trier  and  Munich66.  State  authorities  produced,
exchanged, collected and – ideally at least – updated information concerning suspected
incendiarists. They often based their practical activities on these data. This procedure
required a certain level of professionalism in the law enforcement agencies that could by
no means be taken for granted in the principalities of early sixteenth century Germany.
Even though these lists contained numerous errors and were often outdated, in the form
of warrants of apprehension they had considerable influence on criminal investigations
and on the imagination of arson in the popular mind. The peasants and townspeople, the
so-called subjects, were very interested in obtaining that kind of information, too. Private
persons  owned  copies  of  Mordbrenner  lists.  Starting  in  1540,  lists  of  suspects  were
printed and sold as news sheets67.
33 The ‘common people’ seem to have been eager to support the authorities in their fight
against organized arson. There were numerous denunciations of supposed arsonists68.
Arson was clearly one of those kinds of crime that was particularly well suited to inspire a
feeling of solidarity between the subjects and their respective lordship. By sanctioning
arson, the authorities of the emerging states emphasized their claim to be the guardians
of  the common good.  They appeared willing and capable  to  protect  society from its
collective enemy,  the itinerant gangs of  arsonists.  These arsonists were vagrants,  i.e.
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foreigners or at least strangers. They were said to work on the behalf of foreign powers.
The fight against them was apt to teach sixteenth century society to accept the idea of
territorial  organization.  The  structures  of  territorial  states  that  slowly  marginalized
feudal ties, covenants and community organizations not only proved their power and
usefulness when they punished arsonists. These arsonists were supposed to be mostly
foreigners and to ‘work’ on the behalf of other foreigners. Thus, the fear of arson might
have made it easier for the population of an individual principality to develop a sense of
belonging to this principality and to accept its emerging administrations as legitimate or
indeed as necessary. This development was not hindered but facilitated by the fact that
investigations against itinerants required the authorities of various territories to work
together: When territorial lordships cooperated to organize man-hunts in wide areas they
provided a service for public safety which communal or manorial authorities could not
compete with.
34 The fear of arson was one of the reasons why early modern state organizations took a
keen interest in fire fighting and in measures designed to prevent fires69. These measures
often implied direct interference with the everyday life of townspeople and villagers:
Watches had to be organised, regulations concerning building materials and fire safety
were  enforced.  Territorial  legislation  concerning  fire  fighting  soon  replaced  local
customs. The Feuerbeschauer (surveyor of hearths) was among the oldest local office
holders in Germany.  The impact  of  organized administrative and legal  power on the
‘common people’s’ lives could take the simple and unobtrusive form of a bucket full of
water everyone had to have in his house ready for inspection by state officials70.
35 The organization of the territorial state, its courts, bureaucracies, and law enforcement
agencies grew with the responsibilities they claimed71. It is an undisputed fact that the
Grande Peur contributed massively to the consolidation of the revolutionary order in
France72. The same can be said about the arsonist scare and state building processes in
general. Measures against alleged arsonists’ conspiracies directly promoted state building
and the acceptance of administrative authority by the ‘subjects’.
 
Conclusions and Suggestions
36 It  is  highly  improbable  that  politically  motivated  organized  arson,  perpetrated  by
vagrants and paid for by princes, ever existed. Is it important whether organized arson
was imaginary or real? Delumeau contended himself with pointing out the significance
the fear of arsonists had for the contemporaries73. The government apparatus grew and
became more and more diversified whether the political crime it persecuted existed or
not. However, the critical discussion of the source materials enabled us to correct the
historical reconstruction of vagrancy. In addition to that, we could demonstrate that the
emerging modern states  not  only  persecuted a  fictive  crime but  that  the  fear  of  an
imaginary  political  crime  influenced  state  building  itself.  It  is  a  truism  that
criminalization is a highly flexible process and crime as such a construction of legal and
administrative agencies. However, our discussion of the persecution of organized arson is
not  about  ‘labelling’,  i.e.  the  authoritarian definition of  certain  acts  as  being illegal.
Rather, it is about a fundamentally different issue: The belief in a murderous conspiracy
that  had no basis  in the actual  behaviour displayed by those who were punished as
members  of  that  conspiracy.  The  brief  sketch  of  laws  and  administrative  measures
against organized arson provided here might serve as a basis for further research. In
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order  to  improve  our  understanding  of  the  role  of  the  arsonists’  scare  for  the
development of the policing apparatus we need comparative studies on a European level.
37 In this  article,  I  repeatedly used the terms ‘terrorism’  and ‘terrorist’.  According to a
definition widely accepted by criminologists and law enforcement agencies terrorism is
violence  or  the  threat  of  violence  used  to  achieve  political  ends  either  by  non-
government agencies or by government agencies working secretly74.  Thus, the alleged
crimes of the vagrant arsonists could indeed be called terrorism or rather imaginary
terrorism. This may seem to be an inappropriate actualization or even a political misuse
of a historical topic. However, the apparent anachronism could open a new avenue for
research. The true scope of terrorism and terrorist scares as historical phenomena is yet
to be found. Evidently, it is not enough to discuss terrorism as a problem of nineteenth
and twentieth century history only75. Even though the term ‘terrorism’ was not used till
the ‘terreur’ of the French Revolution76 implanted it into modern parlance the concept of
terrorism was well known at least since the poisoners of the fourteenth century. Any
history  of  terrorism  has  to  keep  in  mind  the  essential  fact  that  authorities  might
misunderstand or misrepresent their respective terrorist enemies. Nevertheless, whether
the terrorist threat was real or imaginary is of secondary importance. It should be asked
how terrorism was perceived of. In what ways did the fear of terrorism influence state
building  processes?  How  did  ‘state  builders’  react  to  the  alleged  activities  of  ‘state
destroyers’? The various constructions of terrorist threats and the state response to these
threats deserve further attention from historians of all periods.
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Throughout the early modern period there were numerous rumors about organized arson. When
the emerging administrations of the early modern states organized fire-fighting, policing, and
measures against the homeless poor, they often did so under the assumption that they were
threatened by incendiarists’ conspiracies. A critical look at the source materials makes it more
than likely that the arsonist scare was a delusion comparable to the fear of witches, poisoners or
Jewish plotters.  Using a supposed peasant upheaval,  the ‘Bundschuh’  rebellion of  1517 as  an
example,  this  article  discusses  how  and  why  arsonist  scares  originated.  There  are  parallels
between modern terrorism and the imaginary organized arson of the early modern period: The
conspiracy  structure,  the  violent  attacks  against  non-combatant  targets  carried  out  by  non-
soldiers in furtherance of political goals, the spread of insecurity and anxiety as an end in itself.
Thus, terrorism as a concept was known to the early modern period and influenced processes of
state building.
Au  début  de  l’époque  moderne,  circulaient  de  multiples  rumeurs  relatives  à  des  incendies
organisés.  Lorsque  les  administrations  émergentes  des  États  de  cette  période  entreprirent
d’organiser la lutte contre l’incendie, la police et le contrôle des pauvres errants, elles le firent
souvent parce qu’elles se voyaient sous la menace supposée d’une conspiration d’incendiaires. Un
examen critique des sources donne clairement à penser que la peur de l’incendiaire était une
illusion comparable à celle des sorcières, empoisonneurs ou comploteurs Juifs.  À partir d’une
prétendue  révolte  paysanne  (la  rébellion  des  «Bundschuh»  de  1517),  cet  article  examine  les
causes  et  les  modes  d’apparition  de  la  peur  des  incendiaires.  Il  existe  un  parallèle  entre  le
terrorisme  moderne  et  l’incendie  organisé  imaginaire  de  l’époque  moderne:  la  structure
conspirative,  l’attaque  violente  de  cibles  non-combattantes  menée  par  des  non-militaires
poursuivant  des  buts  politiques,  la  propagation  comme  une  fin  en  soi  de  l’insécurité  et  de
l’anxiété. En d’autres termes, le concept du terrorisme était connu dès l’époque moderne et a
influencé le processus de construction de l’État.
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